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MORAL JUDGMENT AND CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS:  CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENGAGING IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
ABSTRACT 
 In an experimental study, one hundred fifty-nine evening MBA students were asked to 
assume the role of a manager in a company in which another manager has the opportunity to 
engage in earnings management. In response to the scenario, participants provided causal 
attributions, assessed the morality of the target, and indicated whether they would change their 
judgments about the target’s reputation.  The study manipulated three between-subjects factors: 
1) whether the target manager chose to engage in earnings management, 2) whether the 
company’s budgetary control system was rigid or flexible, and 3) whether the target manager’s 
work history was average or above average.  The results indicated an interactive effect such that 
causal attributions differ more across different budgetary systems when the hypothetical manager 
did not manage earnings than when the manager did.  The results also indicated that morality 
judgments were significantly associated with the hypothetical manager’s behavior, but not with 
budgetary system. In addition, the judgments subjects provided about the manager’s reputation 
were found to be more strongly associated with morality judgments than with causal attributions. 
We discuss implications of the role of reputation in management control systems design.  
 
Key words: Causal Attributions, Earnings Management, Moral Judgment 
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MORAL JUDGMENT AND CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS:  CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENGAGING IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Healy and Wahlen define earnings management as using judgment in reporting financial 
results "and in structuring transactions to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers" (1999, p. 368). More recently, Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim and 
Nemec (2004, p. 267) have conceptualized earnings management as a form of impression 
management whereby flexible accounting principles are used to influence reported earnings, 
thereby causing reported income to be larger or smaller than it might otherwise be. Opportunities 
for earnings management exist because managers typically have the ability to use judgment in 
shaping financial reports (Jensen 2001), both in setting earnings targets and in reporting actual 
results.  Healy and Wahlen (1999) conclude that earnings management is motivated by both 
capital market factors and/or management compensation considerations.  
As an example of the latter motivation, Guidry et al. (1999) use business-unit level data 
to demonstrate that earnings management occurs when managers attempt to maximize or 
increase their bonuses. In their field study, Guidry et al. (1999) found that business-unit 
managers in the bonus range appeared to manage earnings upward through the use of 
discretionary accruals, as compared to business-unit managers who were not in the bonus range.  
This evidence demonstrates that, on average, managers act as if the benefits from engaging in 
earnings management outweigh potential negative consequences whether internal or external to 
the firm.  Simply put, a variety of inducements exist that may motivate managers to manipulate 
both earnings targets and reported results (Jensen, 2001).     
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While evidence indicates that some managers engage in earnings management in order to 
receive performance-based bonuses (Guidry et al. 1999; Healy, 1985), others refrain because 
they consider earnings management activities to be unethical (Merchant and Rockness, 1994; 
Elias, 2004). Accounting researchers have not explored the consequences of earnings 
management, i.e. whether managers who are discovered to have engaged in earnings 
management to enhance their compensation suffer any negative effects on their reputations 
within their firms.    
Our work is motivated in part by Sprinkle (2001, p. 2), who suggests that management 
accounting researchers should investigate “the extent to which social norms, individuals’ 
preferences for non-pecuniary factors such as honesty and fairness, and firms’ information 
systems interact with more formal managerial accounting systems.”  The purpose of this study is 
to examine the reputational consequences when managers engage in earnings management.  
Specifically, the study proposes that observers’ morality assessments and causal attributions 
about a target manager who has an earnings management opportunity will be shaped by both the 
target manager’s behavior and the organization’s budgetary control style.  Further, it is suggested 
here that effects on the target’s reputation will be significantly associated with morality 
assessments about the target manager. We believe that it is important for designers of 
responsibility accounting systems to understand these reputational costs as they design 
management control systems and formal information systems within firms.  
In particular, in this study we ask subjects to judge the morality of earnings management 
decisions in differing budgetary and performance contexts to determine what causal attributions 
are given and how morality judgments and attributions affect others’ impressions about the 
manager who engages in such behavior.  Earnings management has been an area of longstanding 
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concern in the field of accounting, but relatively little research has addressed morality judgments 
of the practice from a management perspective.  Though research directly addressing the issue is 
lacking, it is generally felt that managers tend to be morally sensitive to differing work contexts 
(Brower and Shrader, 2000) and ethical climates (Forte, 2004) in making decisions.  Research 
addressing specific moral judgments potentially help us understand the nature of corporate 
leadership in organizations (Kelly, 2004).  To this end, we seek to empirically explore how 
various specific situations interact with moral judgments of earnings management. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Earnings Management 
Merchant and Rockness contend that earnings management is “probably the most 
important ethical issue facing the accounting profession," (1994, p. 92). Given the recent 
“Enron” environment, this is even truer today.  Merchant and Rockness (1994) provide initial 
evidence on how professionals assess the ethics of earnings management activities. The 
respondents, selected from two corporations and one chapter of the Institute of Internal Auditors, 
were general managers, corporate staff, or operating unit controllers. They were asked to answer 
several questions based on a series of brief scenarios, each of which described an earnings 
management activity undertaken by a hypothetical profit center manager. Participants were asked 
to evaluate the acceptability of each activity. General managers rated the activities as more 
unethical than the corporate staff or unit controllers did. This finding is consistent with earnings 
management having greater negative consequences for line managers than for staff. Presumably, 
non-managers such as corporate staff employees or internal auditors are not competing against 
other managers for compensation or promotion. The responses from the corporate employees 
differed significantly, causing Merchant and Rockness to speculate that respondents from 
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Corporation A may have rated the activities more unethically than did respondents from 
Corporation B because of “one or more difficult-to-observe control factors, such as tone at the 
top” (1994, p. 91).   Additional research by Kaplan (2001a) showed that reactions to earnings 
management varied by the observer’s role.  Those assigned the role of stakeholder saw any 
earnings management attempt as unethical, while those assigned the role of another manager in 
the company took a differentiated view of earnings management.  In this case, subjects assigned 
the role of managers viewed accounting-related earnings management as more unethical than 
operations-related earnings management. 
To a degree this study extends the work of Kaplan (2001a), by further examining the 
reactions of other managers within a firm to accounting-related attempts at earnings 
management.  Rather than simply looking at the ethical judgments associated with accounting-
related earnings management, this study seeks to ascertain the additional roles played by the 
target manager’s record of past performance as well the organization’s budgetary control system.  
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory offers a framework for understanding the processes by which people 
explain, interpret, and respond to the behavior of others (Kelley and Michela, 1980; Weiner, 
1985a). Attribution theorists are concerned with perceptions of causality, or the post-hoc reasons 
individuals use to explain events (Heider, 1958).  In essence, attribution processes involve post 
hoc reasoning whereby the causes of a behavior or an event are inferred from the observation of 
the behavior or event (Mowday, 1983). Such post-hoc sense-making is important because 
individuals use it both to identify the causes of events and to assign personal qualities or 
attributes to others engaging in behavior (Lord and Smith, 1983).  Specifically, causal 
attributions affect and reflect both how we feel about events and people and our expectations of 
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those people (Weiner, 1985b).  Thus, the particular causes that individuals attribute to a given 
behavior or event are closely related to more generalized evaluations (e.g., correspondent 
inferences) of those individuals engaging in behavior (Crant and Bateman, 1993). 
The causal explanations people use to explain events vary on a number of dimensions 
(Weiner, 1985b), but for the purposes of this study the locus dimension is most relevant.  That is, 
human behavior can be explained along a continuum in which the end-points are dispositional 
causes (e.g., internal to the individual engaging in behavior) and situational causes (e.g., external 
to the individual engaging in the behavior) (Kelley and Michela, 1980). The former is primarily 
concerned with an individual’s assessment of the extent to which an event is caused by the 
character, disposition or intent of the person engaging in the event while the latter is due to 
situational factors. 
The application of attribution theory to organizational settings was pioneered by the work 
of Green and Mitchell (1979), among others, and has more recently been applied to examine 
auditor judgments (e.g., Kaplan and Reckers, 1985, 1991, 1993) and jurors’ evaluations (Lowe, 
Reckers, and Whitecotton, 2002).  Attribution theory is most applicable when causality is 
uncertain. Understanding why a manager did or did not engage in earnings management involves 
uncertainty because frequently one cannot inquire too closely about or definitively ascertain that 
such behavior has in fact occurred. 
In this study we explore the attributional processes occurring when an earnings 
management opportunity exists.  Previous earnings management research is extended in three 
ways.  First, the current study examines both the causal attributions and a morality-based 
correspondent inference (e.g., an overall assessment formed about the target manager’s morality) 
individuals form in response to an earnings management opportunity by a target manager.  
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Whereas causal attributions have been examined extensively in auditor judgments and earnings 
forecasts (Kaplan and Reckers, 1985, 1991, 1993; Lowe et al., 2002; Baginski et al., 2004), the 
formation and implications of correspondent inferences has received less attention (Wong-on-
Wing et al., 1989; Reckers and Wong-on-Wing, 1991). We test an alternative hypothesis based 
on Reeder and Spores (1983), who have specified a particular type of ethics-based correspondent 
inference to denote an individual’s ethics or lack thereof.  We provide further evidence on the 
antecedents and consequences of this inference.   
  Second, the current study examines whether an important component of the 
organizational environment, the budgetary control style (Van der Stede, 2000), is associated 
either directly or indirectly with the formation of causal attributions and/or ethically related 
correspondent inferences. As discussed below, the background and context in which behavior 
occurs are predicted to influence and shape causal attributions and correspondent inferences.  We 
contend that any informal discipline in internal labor markets would be contingent upon the 
extent to which the occurrence of an unethical event (e.g., engaging in earnings management) is 
attributed internally, that is, to the disposition or character of the manager.  That is, negative 
outcomes and responses directed towards a target manager are expected only when other 
managers make internal attributions and inferences about the target manager rather than external 
attributions that serve to excuse or exculpate the target manager.  In this regard, we would not 
expect that a target manager’s reputation would be damaged if engaging in earnings management 
is attributed primarily to strong environmental pressures, such as those present in certain 
budgetary control systems. 
Third, we examine the relationship between causal attributions and ethically-based 
correspondent inferences, respectively, and subsequent reputationally-related judgments.  While 
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prior research (Kaplan, 2001a, 2001b) has examined ethics-based correspondent inferences as a 
dependent measure, we contend that such judgments drive subsequent reputationally-related 
judgments to a greater extent than causal attributions do.   
Antecedents to Causal Attributions and Correspondent Inferences  
Kelley (1972) introduced both the discounting and augmentation principles to the 
attribution literature. Under the discounting principle, engaging in behavior that is expected in 
the situation lessens the tendency to make internal attributions and correspondent inferences to 
the individual. Alternatively, under the augmentation principle, engaging in “contraindicated 
behavior” (Michela and Kelley, 1980, p. 470) will strengthen the tendency to make internal 
attributions and correspondent inferences to the individual. We consider the application of these 
principles to observing a target manager’s decision regarding earnings management.  
 The situational variable that could either lead to either discounting or augmentation that 
we examine is the budgetary control system.  While budgetary controls have been defined in 
various ways, the issue has generated strong and continuing interest among management 
accounting researchers (Hopwood, 1972; Merchant, 1998; Van der Stede, 2000).  Budgetary 
control styles fall along a continuum ranging from rigid to flexible.  A rigid budgetary control 
style provides a strong incentive for meeting accounting-based budgets (Merchant, 1998) and is 
one in which managers are evaluated primarily on whether or not they achieved their short-term 
accounting-based budget.  A flexible budgetary control style places less reliance upon 
accounting-based budget information and considers such information in context with other 
information in a longer-term time frame.  
Assuming that budgetary control style leads to discounting or augmentation, we propose 
the following relationships. Ceteris paribus, when engaging in earnings management allows 
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managers to meet their financial targets and when managers work under a rigid budgetary control 
style, observers would expect managers to manage earnings.  Hence, the observers’ attributions 
would reflect discounting, i.e. less emphasis on internal or dispositional explanations.  Similarly, 
when managers refrain from earnings management in a flexible budget regime, they are behaving 
as expected and again observers’ attributions would reflect discounting.  Alternatively, when 
budgetary control styles are rigid and the target manager faces pressure to manage earnings, his 
decision not to do so will lead to attributions that reflect augmentation, i.e. a greater emphasis on 
disposition. In the same vein, a target manager who chooses earnings management even though 
he faces a flexible budgetary control system is doing the unexpected and internal attributions 
made about him will be augmented.   
Hypothesis 1 (a): Earnings management and budgetary control style will interact such 
that under a flexible control setting managers’ causal attributions will be more internally 
oriented when the actor engages in earnings management.  Alternatively, under a rigid 
control setting managers’ causal attributions will be more internally oriented when the 
manager does not engage in earnings management.  
 
We propose that observers will make morality judgments about the target manager that 
reflect their attributions.  When the target behaves as the budgetary control style would lead him 
to, then the morality judgment of him is expected to be relatively neutral.  But if he acts contrary 
to expectations then the judgments will be more extreme.  In the case of managing earnings in a 
flexible budgetary setting he will be seen as unethical (e.g., less moral), in contrast to a rigid 
budgetary setting where a more neutral assessment is expected.   In the case of refraining from 
managing earnings when the budgetary controls are rigid he will be seen as highly moral, in 
contrast to a flexible budgetary setting where a more neutral assessment is expected.  As 
described, morality judgments about the manager will be more favorable under a rigid budgetary 
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setting rather than a flexible budgetary setting.  This argument leads to a related hypothesis 
regarding morality assessments. 
Hypothesis 1 (b):  Morality judgments about the target manager will be more favorable 
when budgetary control style is rigid rather than flexible.   
 
However, a somewhat different pattern of attribution is predicted by other theorists 
(Reeder and Spores, 1983; Erickson and Krull, 1999).  They suggest that because negative 
information weighs heavily in one’s overall impression of a person, a single immoral behavior, 
such as engaging in earnings management, may be enough to sour one’s overall evaluation of a 
person (Reeder and Spores, 1983).  This heightened role of negative information has been found 
by auditing researchers (Butt and Campbell, 1989; Kida, 1984; Trotman and Sng, 1989).  
Moreover, Reeder and Spores (1983), contend that when people observe unethical behavior they 
tend to focus on that behavior and to generalize from that observation. Under their model 
observers tend to believe that if someone behaves unethically in one situation, they are likely to 
do so in other situations and in other ways (cf. also Sanderson and Darley, 2002). Thus when the 
target engages in immoral behavior, an observer infers that the actor is immoral, regardless of the 
situational demands surrounding the behavior (Reeder and Spores, 1983) and holds that person 
accountable for his/her actions.  
However, when ethical behavior is observed (e.g., not engaging in earnings 
management), the ethical behavior may reflect either the target person’ prudence (i.e., he would 
prefer to engage in earnings management but there is no immediate payoff under flexible 
budgetary systems so he reports earnings accurately) or it may reflect good character.   More 
recently, Erickson and Krull (1999) have also argued that morality judgments are more extreme 
than causal attributions, by suggesting that observers infer a dispositional or character trait from 
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behavior and, depending on circumstances may look for causal explanations only after forming a 
morality judgment. 
To test these alternative explanations, we posit the following set of competing hypotheses 
on the role of earnings management and budgetary control systems on causal attributions and 
morality judgments. 
Hypothesis 2 (a):  Earnings management and budgetary control style will interact such 
that managers’ causal attributions differ across budgetary control systems when the actor 
does not engage in earnings management (e.g., attributions will be more internally 
oriented under a rigid control setting than flexible control setting) but will not differ 
across budgetary control systems when the manager does engage in earnings 
management.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (b):  Earnings management and budgetary control systems will interact 
such that morality judgments about the target will differ across budgetary control systems 
when the actor does not engage in earnings management (e.g., attributions will be more 
internally oriented under a rigid control setting than flexible control setting) but will not 
differ across budgetary control systems when the actor engages in earnings management. 
 
Reputation Effects 
 Because our purpose is to examine possible reputational consequences of earnings 
management, it is appropriate to consider how attributions relate to a range of judgments 
and evaluations that managers may rely upon in forming opinions about their colleagues.   
If, as Erickson and Krull (1999) suggest, morality judgments differ from causal 
attributions, one of the differences may be that the process of generalization from moral 
judgments is stronger (broader in its range and more immediate) than generalizations 
from causal attributions. Consequently, we hypothesize that when observers assess the 
reputation of a target manager, their reputational judgments will be more strongly 
associated with morality assessments than with causal attributions. 
Hypothesis 3: Reputation effects will be more strongly associated with morality 
judgments than with causal attributions. 
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METHOD 
Overview and Task 
 The subjects were presented with a scenario describing an earnings management 
opportunity for a target manager, Mr. Jones, a divisional manager for a public company.  
Participants were instructed to assume the role of another manager working for this same 
company. The earnings management opportunity involved the possibility that Mr. Jones could 
defer receipt and related expense accrual of a bill for $220,000, which is part of an ongoing 
consulting engagement. Participants received a single, randomly assigned case.  In response to 
the scenario, participants provided a series of responses described below. To complete the 
questionnaire, participants responded to manipulation checks and several questions about their 
background.  
Independent Variables 
 The study contained three between-subjects independent variables, as follows: behavior 
of the target manager, the nature of the organization’s budgetary control system, and the target 
manager’s work history.    
 Earnings Management Behavior   
The target manager’s behavior was operationalized as a binary variable with two levels. 
In the earnings management condition, the scenario indicated that the target manager engaged in 
the earnings management activity.  Under this manipulation, the case read, in part: 
For the most recent period, the division reached targeted net income…. 
You learn that divisional expenses did not include the costs from an 
ongoing consulting engagement.   Mr. Jones called the engagement 
partner of a consulting firm that was doing some work for the division 
and asked that the firm not send an invoice until next year.  The partner 
agreed.  Mr. Jones knew this action was questionable but that it would 
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allow the division to reach targeted net income. … Divisional net income 
would have been below targeted net income had the expenses from the 
consulting engagement been included as part of this year’s divisional 
expenses.     
 
In the non-earnings management condition, the scenario indicated that the target manager did not 
engage in the earnings management activity.  Subjects in this condition read a case that said, in 
part: 
For the most recent period, the division did not reach targeted net 
income…. You learn, however, that divisional expenses included the costs 
from an ongoing consulting engagement.   Mr. Jones considered calling 
the engagement partner of a consulting firm that was doing some work for 
the division and asking that the firm not send an invoice until next year.  
While Mr. Jones was sure that the partner would agree, he concluded that 
such an action would be wrong. … Divisional net income would have been 
above the targeted net income had the expenses from the consulting 
engagement been excluded from this year’s divisional expenses. 
 
Budgetary Control Style  
 The nature of the organization’s budgetary control style was manipulated to alter the 
situational demands confronting the hypothetical manager.  Under the rigid style, the case 
described a budgetary control system with a heavy emphasis on meeting short-term targets.  
Specifically, the case read, in part: 
As a manager you have found the company’s reward structure to have a 
strong orientation towards short-term performance.  As an example, a 
budgeted annual income target is set for each division and it is important 
for division managers to meet the target.  Division managers achieving 
budgeted annual income targets receive favorable evaluations and a 
substantial bonus.  However, division managers who do not meet budgeted 
incomes receive unfavorable evaluations and do not get the bonus.  The 
extent to which the division is progressing towards long term strategic 
goals has almost no impact on the manager’s performance evaluation.  
     
 
 Under the flexible style, the case described a budgetary control system with less emphasis 
placed on meeting short-term targets.  Specifically, the case read, in part:   
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As a manager you have found the company’s reward structure to have a 
strong orientation towards long-term performance.  To enhance 
coordination and communication, a budgeted annual income target for 
each division is established.  However, within the company whether the 
budgeted annual income targets are achieved is not important.  For 
example, the manager’s bonus is not tied to achieving this budget and 
whether the budget is achieved has little influence on the division 
manager’s overall performance evaluation.  Instead, division managers 
are evaluated primarily with respect to measures more directly tied 
towards meeting long-term strategic objectives.  Also, bonuses are tied to 
measures of long-term strategic goals.    
 
Target Manager’s Work History 
The target manager’s work history was manipulated at two levels. Under the average 
work history level, the case read, in part, “He has a reputation for being hard-working and 
knowledgeable, and his division and his evaluations have been average.”  Under the above 
average work history level, the case read, in part, “He has a reputation for being hard-
working and knowledgeable, and his division and his evaluations have been very 
favorable.” 
Dependent Variables 
The study includes three groups of dependent variables: (1) causal attributions, (2) 
morality judgments, and (3) four other managerially related measures of reputation.  
Attribution Measure 
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which (1) factors related to Mr. Jones’s 
disposition or character (e.g., internal scale), and (2) factors related to the situation and the 
organization (e.g., external scale) contributed to Mr. Jones’s action. Two separate nine-point 
scales were presented, anchored by “very unlikely cause” (1) and “very likely cause” (9). A net 
attribution score for each participant was computed by subtracting the rating on the external scale 
from the rating on the dispositional scale.  The net attribution score has a range of -8 (situational 
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causality) to 8 (dispositional causality). This net score indicates the relative importance of factors 
related to the manager’s internal traits vs. situational factors. A positive score indicates that the 
participant attributed the manager’s action more to dispositional (internal) causes than to 
situational (external) causes. A negative score indicates that the manager’s action was attributed 
more to the situation than to the manager’s character. A score of zero indicates that the two 
factors contributed equally to the manager’s behavior. This method of netting attribution 
measures is common (Elig and Frieze, 1979) and has been used previously to measure auditors’ 
net attribution scores (Kaplan and Reckers, 1985; Wong-on-Wing et al., 1988). 
Morality Measure 
The second measure is participants’ assessment (or judgment) of the morality of the 
hypothetical manager.  Participants were asked, “Based on the available information, how would 
you judge the morality of Mr. Jones?” The end-points on a nine-point scale were “very immoral” 
(1) and “very moral” (9). 
Other Managerial Reputation Effects 
 The study also examines other managerially relevant judgments. These include how 
knowledgeable Mr. Jones is, how hard-working Mr. Jones is, Mr. Jones’ decision making ability, 
and how willing the subject would be to work with Mr. Jones. 
As part of the background information describing Mr. Jones, he was characterized as 
having “a reputation for being hard-working and knowledgeable.” On two separate scales 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which Mr. Jones’ actions changed their 
impressions of Mr. Jones in terms of his reputation for being (1) hard working, and (2) 
knowledgeable. Each nine-point scale was anchored by “Action greatly diminishes reputation” 
(1) and “Action greatly strengthens reputation” (9).   Participants were also asked, “Based on the 
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available information, how would you assess Mr. Jones’s decision-making ability during the 
current year?” The end-points on a nine-point scale were “substantially below expectations” (1) 
and “substantially above expectations” (9).  The mid-point (5) was labeled “at expectations.”  
Finally, participants were asked, “Based on the available information, how willing would you be 
to work with Mr. Jones on an important company project?”  The end-points on a nine-point scale 
were “extremely unwilling” (1) and “extremely willing” (9). 
Subjects 
 Evening MBA students at a major metropolitan state university were used as participants 
for the study. The students were enrolled in a managerial accounting course, which is taken in 
the second year. Evening MBA students typically are older than full-time students and have 
substantial work experience. One hundred sixty two questionnaires were distributed and 159 
questionnaires were completed. The remaining three had missing data and were excluded from 
the analysis.  The majority of participants was male (65 percent) and had been involved in 
preparing a budget or providing information for others preparing a budget (63 percent).  In 
addition, the mean age and professional work experience among participants were approximately 
32 years and 10 years, respectively.   
RESULTS  
Manipulation Checks 
 After reading the case, participants answered manipulation checks to determine whether 
they were aware of the budgetary control system and work history of the hypothetical manager.  
Regarding the budgetary control style faced by the manager, participants were asked two 
questions.  The first question asked, “How would you assess the culture of the company?” on a 
nine-point scale anchored by “long-term performance oriented” (1) to “short-term performance 
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oriented” (9).  The second question asked, “How important is it for division managers to achieve 
budgeted annual income targets?” on a nine-point scale anchored by “not important at all” (1) to 
“very important” (9).  Mean responses to these two questions among participants in the rigid 
condition were 8.3 and 8.0, respectively.  Mean responses to these two questions among 
participants in the flexible condition were 3.4 and 4.2, respectively.  On each of the two 
questions, the differences between the two groups were significant (p<.01).  Regarding the work 
history of the hypothetical manager, participants were asked, “Prior to the current year, how 
would you assess the manager’s work history:” The nine-point scale was anchored by “very 
below average” (1) to “very above average” (9).  Mean responses from the average and above 
average work history treatment levels were 4.8 and 6.7, respectively.  The two groups were 
statistically different from one another (p<.01).  These responses indicate that participants 
attended to the manipulations of budgetary control system and target manager’s work history. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the dependent 
variables used in this study.  Hypotheses 1(a and b) and 2(a and b) were tested using a 2x2x2 
between-subjects factorial design. The three independent variables of target behavior (earning 
management versus no earnings management), the organization’s budgetary control style (rigid 
versus flexible) and the target’s work history (average versus above average) were analyzed 
using the general linear analysis of variance model, which accommodates unequal cell sizes.  
Hypothesis 3 was tested using regression analysis. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 2 reports the ANOVA results for the effects of earnings management, budgetary 
control style and work history on net attributions and morality judgments.  Significant main 
effects were found for both earnings management (F=20.54, p<.001) and work history (F=4.65; 
p<.05) on net attributions.  Subjects turned to more internal/dispositional attributions when the 
target manager did not engage in earnings management (Mean=1.54) than when the manager did 
in engage in earnings management (Mean=-.58; p<.001).  As shown in Table 2, earnings 
management explained 12 percent of the variance in net attributions.  Moreover, the behavior of 
the target manager was attributed more to internal factors when the manager was described as an 
average performer (Mean=.97) than when he was described as an above average performer 
(Mean=.01; p<.05).   In this case, work history explained 3 percent of the variance in net 
attributions.  However, it is the finding of a significant interaction effect (explaining 4 percent of 
the variance) between the earnings management and the budgetary control style that is most 
relevant to this study.  Recall, that both Hypothesis 1(a) and Hypothesis 2(a) predict a significant 
interaction between earnings management and budgetary control style.  However, each predicts a 
different interaction pattern.   Figure 1 shows the nature of the observed interaction.  The 
observed pattern conforms to the pattern predicted by hypothesis 2(a).  That is, net attributions 
were not affected by budgetary control style when earnings management occurred but were 
affected by budgetary control style when earnings management did not occur.   The strongest 
internal attributions were assigned to the actor who did not engage in earnings management in 
the rigid budgetary control system (Mean = 2.60). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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Table 2 reveals a strong, significant effect for earnings management on morality 
assessments (F=251.95; p<.001), explaining 63 percent of the variance.   The absence of a 
significant main effect for budgetary control style fails to support Hypothesis 1(b).  Further the 
absence of a significant interaction effect for target behavior and the budgetary control style fails 
to support Hypothesis 2(b).  The finding of a significant interaction between earnings 
management and work history, while not directly related to Hypothesis 1(b) or 2(b) is interesting, 
nonetheless.  Above average performers were judged more moral when they engaged in earnings 
management than were average performers (Mabove avg.=4.21, Mavg=3.49), but slightly less moral 
when they did not engage in earnings management (Mabove avg.=7.23, Mavg.=7.39).  This 
interaction effect explained 3 percent of the variance in morality assessments. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 Hypothesis 3 addresses the extent to which other managerially-relevant judgments are 
associated with either causal attributions and/or morality assessments. These include assessments 
of how much the reputation of the target has changed in terms of how hard-working and 
knowledgeable the target is, his decision-making ability, as well as changes in the observer’s 
willingness to work with the target. Regression analysis was used to determine the association 
between causal attribution and morality assessments on each of the four dependent variables.  
 Table 3 shows the results of regressing the subjects’ net attributions and morality 
assessments on the four reputation perceptions of the target manager:  diligence (i.e. willingness 
to work hard), knowledge, decision making capability, and their willingness to work with the 
target manager.  As shown in Table 3, morality assessments have a much greater and more 
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pervasive affect on reputational judgments about the target manager than do net attributions, 
findings that support Hypothesis 3. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION  
 While prior research (Healy, 1985; Guidry et al., 1999) has provided important insights 
indicating that some managers opportunistically manage earnings, little attention has been given 
to the potential internal negative consequences associated with engaging in such behavior. The 
current paper provides evidence on these potential negative consequences in terms of causal 
attributions observers make to explain such behavior, the morality judgments observers make, 
and reputational consequences, including perceptions of their work ethic, knowledge, decision 
making abilities and the future willingness of colleagues to work with them.   
Limitations  
 Before discussing the results of the study, several limitations related to the use of an 
experimental approach should be noted.  As part of an experimental approach, participants 
responded to a scenario about a target manager’s opportunity to engage in earnings management.  
This approach has previously been used in studies to measure ethically-related judgments (Becker 
and Fritzche, 1987; Flory et al., 1992; Singer and Singer, 1997), attributions, and performance-
related judgments (Kaplan and Reckers, 1985).  The strengths of this approach include 
experimental control and the ability to manipulate key variables.  A concern, however, with this 
approach is that it is not possible for the stimulus material to contain all relevant information that 
would be available in a real-world setting.  For example, although amounts were given for the 
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potential earnings management activity as well as the size of the company, other financial 
statement information as well other non-financial information was not provided.  Potentially, the 
availability of such additional information might have influenced the judgments examined in this 
study.   
 Second, the participants in the study were evening MBA students asked to assume the 
role of a company manager. While the majority of these students had substantial professional 
work experience and had been involved with the budgeting process, caution is warranted in 
extrapolating these findings to the work environment.  Third, the dependent measures used in the 
study were almost exclusively one-item scales.  The use of such measures leaves open questions 
of the validity and reliability of these measures. 
Results 
 The results of the study support Reeder and Spores’ (1983) notion (Hypothesis 2a) that 
causal attributions would differ more across budgetary systems when a target manager had not 
engaged in earnings management than when he had.  This is based on the notion that immoral 
behavior reflects immoral dispositions, while moral behavior may sometimes indicate moral 
character but could also indicate prudent or strategic behavior by an immoral person.  The data 
provided support for the hypothesized relationship.  
When the target manager behaved ethically (i.e., did not engage in earnings management) 
the mean net attribution measure was positive, indicating that internal factors were perceived as 
having greater influence on the target manager’s actions than the circumstances.  This finding is 
consistent with the actor-observer attributional effect reported by Jones and Nisbett (1972), 
which showed that observers of a target person (actor) naturally turn to the actor per se as the 
cause of an event.  However, when the target manager engaged in earnings management the 
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mean net attribution measure was slightly negative, indicating that organizational factors were 
perceived as having a slightly greater influence on the target’s actions than did the character of 
the target manager.  In other words, the short term nature of the budget focus faced by the target 
manager may have served as a potential (situational) explanation for the engagement in earnings 
management.  Given that most of the subjects in this study had experience with a budgetary 
process, they may have empathized with the target manager who engages in earnings 
management.  Empathy for the situation faced by an actor has been shown to offset the actor-
observer effect (Regan and Totten, 1975), a finding similar to an effect found by Tan and Lipe 
(1997), that MBA subjects were not likely to judge a target’s actions harshly, even when the 
outcomes of the target’s decisions were negative.   
The results supported a strong main effect of behavior on morality judgments, but neither 
the predicted main effect for budgetary control style (Hypothesis 1b) nor the predicted 
interaction between budgetary control style and behavior (Hypothesis 2b) was significant at 
traditional levels. Thus, no support is found for either Hypotheses 1b or 2b.  Respondents judged 
target managers who did not engage in earnings management as being more moral, regardless of 
the situational (budgetary control) constraints.  The lack of a significant interaction effect may 
reflect differences in the ethicality of events considered by the two studies. In their second 
experiment Reeder and Spores used an incident where the subject sees someone drop a twenty-
dollar bill and chooses either to keep it or to call out to the person who dropped the money. Their 
second incident involved stealing from a charity box set up by the cash register in a pizzeria. 
These incidents may be less morally ambiguous than earnings management is, particularly in this 
age of Enron. In this regard, Bruns and Merchant (1990) contend that there is a lack of 
agreement among managers regarding the acceptability of earnings management activities. 
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While Merchant and Rockness (1994) showed a lack of consensus among professionals about the 
morality of earnings management, the societal context surrounding earnings management today 
appears to have resolved any such ambiguity.   
 The third hypothesis is based on the distinction Hamilton (1980) notes between ascribing 
causation and assigning moral responsibility. We hypothesized that when the participants formed 
a variety of reputation-related judgments about the target manager, these would be more closely 
associated with their morality judgments than with their causal explanations (internal 
attributions). Consistent with hypothesis 3, the results from each of the four reputation-related 
judgments indicated a stronger association with morality judgments than with net attribution 
judgments.  These results support the contention by Erickson and Krull (1999) that morality 
judgments are more extreme than causal attributions. Our results are also consistent with the 
findings of Reeder and Spores (1983), who found that subjects are likely to generalize from their 
morality judgments. That is, if a person behaves immorally in one context, observers infer that 
the person will behave immorally in other ways. 
Implications 
 Reputational consequences of ethical actions have not been widely studied in accounting. 
These findings are important, however, because they indicate that managers engaging in earnings 
management may face negative reputational costs from other managers, which in turn, may serve 
as a disincentive towards engaging in earnings management.  Several implications stem from this 
research.  First, to the degree that managers who engage in earnings management go unpunished, 
or are perhaps even rewarded, the tendency to continue to engage in such practices is reinforced.  
As the support for Hypothesis 2a suggests, observers tend not to blame an individual for earnings 
management when the budgetary control system supports such behavior. Blaming the target for 
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behaving as rewarded results in what Kerr (1995) calls the folly of rewarding A while hoping for 
B.  That is, we would hope that managers would not engage in such behavior, but the system 
rewards them for doing so. 
 Second, research has shown that failing to discipline has consequences not only for the 
person who engages in suspect behavior, but also for observers of such behavior (Trevino, 1992).  
Trevino’s research shows that others within organizations expect rule violators to be punished in 
order to maintain the social order and the punishment or failure to punish can be expected to 
influence observers’ subsequent behaviors.  In short, punishment or the failure to punish sends 
very real messages throughout the organization. 
The ethical reputation a manager has among colleagues can play an informal, but 
significant, role in internal disciplining of managers by other managers.  Research by Hollinger 
and Clark (1983) on employee deviance demonstrated that the effect of informal sanctions was 2 
½ times greater than that of formal sanctions.  The results of this study offer some evidence on 
what shapes the way workers view the morality of their colleagues. For example, we find 
evidence that among participants there is a tendency to generalize from a morality judgment to 
other dimensions that relate to competence, such as being hard working, knowledgeable, and 
able to make decisions.  Informal assessments managers make regarding their colleagues, based 
at least in part on ethical concerns, can play a real but not well-measured or understood aspect of 
management control systems. We have provided evidence that social costs are imposed on 
managers when they do not behave in goal congruent ways. Cohen and Prusak (2001) reinforce 
the importance of establishing social capital, i.e. goodwill and trust among employees within 
firms. These authors maintain that high social capital results in better financial results. The loss 
of trust that can be engendered by earnings management would be a loss of such social capital, 
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and is an issue that accounting researchers could examine more fully.  Noreen (1988, p. 367) 
noted that a cost of unethical behavior is a decline in ethical norms, which leads to an increase in 
unethical behavior. 
Given the paucity of research on the topic of informal, ethically-related aspects of control 
systems, additional research should be encouraged.  For example, further research could explore 
whether the negative consequences vary across different kinds or magnitudes of earnings 
management activities.  In this regard, the results of the current study suggest that in spite of its 
limitations, an experimental approach is a viable and appropriate method.  Perhaps, within an 
experimental setting the influence of ambiguity could be examined.  For example, a future study 
could manipulate the degree to which organizations include various types of earnings 
management activities in following Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifying the 
inclusion of understandable disclosure in reports and documents filed with the SEC (Lander, 
2004).  Another possible avenue of further research is to look at how informal discipline within 
internal labor markets can lead to changes or reductions in more formal monitoring procedures. 
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Table 1 
 
Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
(N=159) 
 
 
 
           Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Internal Attributions (1)          .48   3.33   - 
 
Morality (2)          5.56 2.24 .34**    - 
 
Hardworking (3)         5.28 1.56     .06 .43**    - 
 
Knowledgeable (4)         5.52 1.57    -.04 .35** .61**    - 
 
Decision Making Ability (5)        5.62 1.91      .08 .59** .41** .50**    - 
 
Willingness to Work With (6)       5.69 2.16      .23** .75** .31** .38** .64**    - 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
**p<.01 
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Table 2 
 
      The Effect of Earnings Management, Budgetary Control Style and Work History on 
           Causal Attributions and Morality Assessments 
 
 
           Net    Morality 
Source     Attributions  Assessments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        F-Score                 F-Score 
   
Earnings Management (EM)    20.54 ***    251.95*** 
           (.12)a             (.63) 
 
Budgetary Control Style  (BCS)     3.46         3.12 
 
Work History (WH)       4.65*        1.74 
            (.03) 
 
EM X BCS        5.44*        3.05 
           (.04) 
 
EM X WH        1.65         3.85* 
                  (.03) 
BCS X WH        1.35           .96 
 
EM X BCS X WH         .08         2.30 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    *p<.05 
  **p<.01 
***p<.001 
 
a eta 2 values presented in parentheses
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Net Attributions and Morality Assessments  
 
   
 Panel A: Earnings management Behavior and Budgetary Control Style Means for Net Attributions  
(standard deviation)       
 
                     Earning Management Behavior  
 Did not Manage Did Manage  
BCS1 –rigid -0.7  (2.9) 2.6  (3.6) 1.0 (3.6) 
BCS2  - flexible -0.5  (2.7) 0.5  (3.1) 0.1 (2.9) 
 -0.6  (2.8) 1.5  (3.5)  
 
  
 
 Panel B:  Work history Means for Net Attributions (standard deviation) 
 
           Work history 
Average  1.0  (3.1) 
Above average 0.0  (3.5) 
  
 
 
Panel C:  Earnings management Behavior and work history means for morality  
    assessments (standard deviation)       
 
                     Earning Management Behavior  
 Did not Manage Did Manage  
Work history –average   3.5  (1.1) 7.4  (1.7) 5.3 (2.4) 
Work history – above   4.2  (1.0) 7.2  (1.7) 5.8 (2.1) 
   3.8  (1.1) 7.3  (2.1)  
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Table 3 
 
Regression Analysis on Target Manager’s Reputational Judgments 
 
 
        Decision Making  Willingness to 
  Hardworking  Knowledgeable       Capability     work with 
 
  Beta t-value  Beta t-value  Beta t-value            Beta         t-value 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Net 
Attributions -.04 -1.23  -.08 -2.23*  -.07 -1.92               -.02         -.51 
 
Morality 
Assessments  .32  6.01***   .29  5.20***   .54  9.27***  .74     13.62*** 
 
Model R2   .19    .15    .36   .57 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    *p<.05 
  **p<.01 
***p<.001 
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1 Positive scores on the net attribution measure are indicative of internal attributions, while negative scores   
   indicate situational attributions. 
Figure 1 
 
Interaction of Earnings Management and 
Budgetary Control Style on Net Attributions1 
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